Traditional game-theoretic models presume that utilities depend on actions. While this framework is quite general (it can, for example, accommodate profit-maximization, altruism, inequity aversion, and Rawlsian maximin preferences) it is not rich enough to adequately describe several psychological or social aspects of motivation which depend directly on beliefs (about beliefs) besides which actions are chosen. The following example illustrates:
various forms of belief-dependent motivation. Geanakoplos et al develop a new analytical framework, in which the centerpiece is the notion of a psychological game, which may be seen as a generalization of a traditional game and which can model some of the desired effects. A psychological game differs from a traditional game in that utilities are defined on beliefs (about actions and beliefs), as well as on which actions are chosen. (The term "game with beliefdependent motivation" would be more descriptive than the term "psychological game," but I stick with the latter which has become established.)
The most well-known example of a psychological-games based application is Rabin's (1993) highly influential model of reciprocity, according to which players wish to act kindly (unkindly) in response to kind (unkind) actions. The key notion of kindness depends on beliefs in a way such that reciprocal motivation can only be described using psychological games. To see why, suppose that I jump out in front of your car blocking your way, so that you can't cross a bridge and you therefore arrive late to an important meeting. Am I kind? Clearly one cannot say without knowing what my beliefs are. If I believe the bridge is as sturdy as bridges usually are and I am just goofing around, then I am unkind. However, if I believe the bridge is about to collapse then I am kind. Arguably, I would be kind even if I mistook a sturdy bridge for a dangerous one. So, should you be kind or unkind in return? The answer depends on your beliefs about my kindness, and hence on your beliefs about my beliefs. It takes a psychological game to model that. (The example given here is similar in spirit to another example given on p 23 of Rabin (1998) . Rabin's model is normal-form based. See Dufwenberg & Kirchsteiger (2004) for an extension to extensive game forms. See Fehr & Gächter (2000) and Sobel (2005) for general discussions of why reciprocity has important economic consequences.)
Reciprocity is but one form of motivation that can be modeled by means of psychological games. Many emotions are good candidates. In his article "Emotions and Economic Theory", Elster (1998) argues that a variety of emotions have important economic consequences and he laments the attention economists have paid to this. He argues that a key characteristic of emotions is that "they are triggered by beliefs" (p. 49). He discusses anger, hatred, guilt, shame, pride, admiration, regret, rejoicing, disappointment, elation, fear, hope, joy, grief, envy, malice, indignation, jealousy, surprise, boredom, sexual desire, enjoyment, worry, and frustration. He asks (p. 48): "[H]ow can emotions help us explain behavior for which good explanations seem to be lacking?" Psychological games may be useful for providing answers.
Little work has been done though. One exception is Caplin & Leahy's (2004) health care model in which a physician is concerned with a patient's belief-dependent anxiety (cf. also Caplin & Leahy 2001) . Another exception is the emotion of guilt for which a string of results, both theoretical and experimental, have been established for the specific context of trust games (see Huang & Wu (1994) , Dufwenberg (1995 Dufwenberg ( , 2002 , Dufwenberg & Gneezy (2000) , Bacharach, Charness & Dufwenberg (2005) ). I shall elaborate in some detail on these latter findings (borrowing eclectically from the cited works), since they may be suggestive of the importance of psychological games more generally in a variety of ways.
Consider the game in Figure 1 , where payoffs reflect money income (first for player A, then for player B) but not the players' preferences which may depend also on guilt as will be indicated.
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Assume that the more strongly player B believes that player A believes that B will make choice r', the more guilt B would feel making choice l' and the more likely B is to make choice r'. Specifically, the players' utilities at the various end nodes in the game form of Figure 1 coincide with the monetary payoffs, except following the choice sequence (r, l') where B's utility is 3⋅(1-β) rather than 3, and where β is a measure of B's belief (with range from 0 to 1) about A's belief that B will choose r'. (More specifically, B has a probability measure describing her beliefs about which probability A assigns to the choice r' conditional on A choosing r; β is the mean of that measure.) Say that B is guilt averse. This is all modeled in the psychological game in Figure 2 :
I wish to make several points: First, the guilt aversion modeled in Figure 2 is similar to that involved in the above example featuring Karen & Jim. In fact, the idea that people feel guilty in proportion to the degree to which they do not live up to another's expectations could be extended to any game.
Second, one can test for guilt aversion experimentally, but this requires one to measure B's belief β. This can be done by inviting subjects to make guesses about one another's choices and promise by B can thus feed a self-fulfilling circle of beliefs about beliefs that r' will be chosen.
In combination with guilt aversion, words may be tools that create commitment power, which may in turn foster trust and cooperation. To sum things up: the idea of guilt aversion is intuitively plausible, experimentally testable, empirically supported, relevant for explaining why communication matters to economic behavior, and suggestive of intriguing signaling issues that may shape emotions and behavior.
These insights concern a very special emotion and a very special psychological game, but seem profound given that limited scope. One may reasonably suspect that exciting conclusions are in store also for other emotions and other strategic settings, and that these conclusions may in part concern communication or belief signaling.
The discussion up till now may have been misleading in its rather heavy emphasis on reciprocity and emotions. Psychological game theory may be relevant also for describing certain social rewards (norms, respect, and status), where decision makers somehow care about the opinions or views of others. Bernheim (1994) and Dufwenberg & Lundholm (2001) present models that bear this out. These authors do not make explicit mention of psychological games, but if one takes a close look at the mathematical details one can discover connections.
One might hope that Geanakoplos et al's framework is appropriate for tackling all the interesting problems that psychological games may be relevant for. However, this is not the case.
A careful scrutiny reveals that their approach is too restrictive to handle many plausible forms of belief-dependent motivation (as they acknowledge themselves; see pp. 70, 78). There are several reasons, including the following:
(1) Geanakoplos et al only allow initial beliefs to enter the domain of a player's utility, while many forms of belief-dependent motivation require updated beliefs to play a role.
(2) Geanakoplos et al only allow a player's own beliefs to enter the domain of his utility, while there are conceptual and technical reasons to let others' beliefs matter.
(3) Geanakoplos et al follow the traditional extensive-games approach of letting strategies influence utilities only insofar as they influence which end node is reached, but many forms of belief-dependent motivation become compelling in conjunction with preferences that depend on strategies in ways not captured by end nodes.
(4) Geanakoplos et al restrict attention to equilibrium analysis, but in many strategic situations there is little compelling reason to expect players to coordinate on an equilibrium and one may wish to explore alternative assumptions.
(1) is manifest, for example, in the above psychological forward induction argument which hinges crucially on B's motivation depending on an updated belief. (2) is relevant, for example, for modeling social rewards (cf. the above comments on Bernheim's and Dufwenberg & Lundholm's models). As regards (3), one can show that the issue comes up if one wants to model, for example, regret, disappointment, or guilt. (4) echoes considerations relevant also for traditional games; equilibrium play is not a self-evident proposition in many contexts, for example if one assumes (only) that there is common belief in rationality, or in learning scenarios.
The list (1)- (4) is adapted from Battigalli & Dufwenberg (2005) , who elaborate in more detail on each issue and take first steps towards developing psychological game theory in the indicated directions. Their approach draws crucially on Battigalli & Siniscalchi's (1999) work on how to represent hierarchies of conditional beliefs.
The decision-theoretic foundations of psychological game theory are not well understood.
Classical decision theory (say von Neumann/Morgenstern) does not apply straightforwardly. Too see this, take the emotion of disappointment as an example. It is plausible that disappointment is a belief-dependent emotion. To exemplify, I have I just failed to win a million dollars, and I am not at all disappointed, which however I clearly would be if I were playing poker and knew I would win a million dollars unless my opponent got extremely lucky drawing to an inside straight, and then he hit his card. Another example could be based on the lotteries used in the socalled Allais' paradox. In both cases the level of disappointment, which if anticipated might affect choice behavior, may plausibly depend on the strength of prior belief that a decision maker will win a lot of money. It follows that, unless consequences are described so as to include a specification of disappointment, the so-called "independence axiom" will not make much sense for decision makers who are prone to disappointment.
Decision-theorists have not given related matters zero attention (though it seems scant). Machina (1981, pp 172-3; p 1662 presents examples in spirit related to the one million dollar example above. Bell (1985) , Loomes & Sugden (1986) , Karni (1992) , and Karni & Schlee (1995) go on to develop models in which utility may depend directly on beliefs; the latter two references take axiomatic approaches. Robin Pope has written extensively, over many years, about how conventional decision theory excludes various forms of belief-dependent motivation; Pope (2004) expounds her program and gives further references. Caplin & Leahy (2001) develop a model of "psychological expected utility" that admits belief-dependent motivation. However, these contributions mainly develop perspectives for settings with single decision-makers, and more will be needed to address games more generally.
Research on psychological games is still in its infancy. This is true for all facets of investigation: the development of basic classes of games and solution concepts, the investigation of decision-theoretic underpinning, tests of empirical (most likely experimental) validity, and finally applied theoretical work which uses psychological game theory to analyze various economic models. In each of these domains some work has been done which is indicative of the viability of the line of research, and there is good reason to be thrilled about the prospects for future research.
